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Abstract
In this paper we study the e¤ect of reference pricing on pharmaceutical prices and ex-
penditures when generic entry is endogenously determined. We develop a Salop-type model
where a brand-name producer competes with generic producers in terms of prices. In the
market there are two types of consumers: (i) brand biased consumers who choose between
brand-name and generic drugs, and (ii) brand neutral consumers who choose between the
di¤erent generic drugs. We nd that, for a given number of rms, reference pricing leads
to lower prices of all products and higher brand-name market shares compared with a re-
imbursement scheme based on simple coinsurance. Thus, in a free entry equilibrium, the
number of generics is lower under reference pricing than under coinsurance, implying that
the net e¤ects of reference pricing on prices and expenditures are ambiguous. Allowing for
price cap regulation, we show that the negative e¤ect on generic entry can be reversed, and
that reference pricing is more likely to result in cost savings than under free pricing. Our re-
sults shed light on the mixed empirical evidence on the e¤ects of reference pricing on generic
entry.
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1 Introduction
The design of reimbursement schemes for prescription drugs is a key issue for policy makers
around the world. Most countries have introduced cost sharing on the demand side in order to
increase demand elasticity and contain (the growth in) pharmaceutical expenditures. In Europe
copayment schemes with coinsurance, where the consumer pays a xed percentage of the medical
cost, have become popular among policy makers.1 In the US there has been a similar trend.
The extension of Medicare to cover prescription drugs (Part D) in 2006 spurred an increase in
the use of coinsurance schemes.2 The advantage of coinsurance (relative to deductibles or xed
copays) is that it directly links the copayment to the price of the drug, which is likely to make
demand more responsive to price di¤erences.
To further increase demand elasticity and contain pharmaceutical expenditures, policy mak-
ers in many countries have introduced reference pricing (sometimes called internal referencing).
Under reference pricing the payer denes a maximum price that will be reimbursed for a group of
drugs with similar therapeutic e¤ects, implying that consumers demanding higher priced drugs
have to pay, in addition to the regular copayment, the di¤erence between the actual price and
the reference price. Thus, by limiting insurance coverage for high-priced drugs, reference pricing
is likely to stimulate demand elasticity and encourage price competition. In this paper we study
the competitive e¤ects of these reimbursement schemes, and ask whether reference pricing is
more likely to contain pharmaceutical expenditures than coinsurance with a xed percentage
reimbursement.
Several studies have shown that reference pricing stimulates competition between brand-
name and generic drugs, and triggers price reductions by brand-name rms to prevent loss of
market shares to generic producers.3 However, only a few studies have considered the impact
of reference pricing on generic entry, and the results from these studies are mixed.4 Clearly,
1See, for instance, Carone, Schwierz and Xavier (2012) for an overview and a discussion of the recent devel-
opment of cost-containment policies in the EU.
2The Medicare Modernization Act in 2003 established a standard drug benet that all Medicare Part
D plans must o¤er, which basically is a coinsurance scheme (with a deductible). For exact details, see
www.medicare.gov/part-d.
3This was rst shown in the seminal paper of Pavcnik (2002). Later papers, such as Bergman and Rudholm
(2003), Brekke et al. (2009, 2011) and Kaiser et al. (2014), report similar ndings.
4A few studies report a negative e¤ect of reference pricing on generic entry (Ekelund, 2001, Moreno-Torres et
al., 2009), whereas others nd no e¤ect (Rudholm, 2001) or a positive e¤ect (Brekke et al., 2015)
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if the brand-name producers are more aggressive in their price setting under reference pricing,
the expected prots to generic producers may be lower than under coinsurance. In this case
reference pricing may reduce generic competition and thus, in theory, be counterproductive in
reducing pharmaceutical prices and expenditures.
To study the e¤ects of reference pricing on generic entry, we develop a novel Salop-type
model where a brand-name producer competes with several generic producers in terms of prices.
In the market there are two types of consumers; brand biased and brand neutral. Brand biased
consumers have a preference for the brand-name drug and only buy a generic alternative if it is
su¢ ciently cheaper. Brand neutral consumers, on the other hand, always prefer a generic drug
if it is cheaper than the brand-name drug. Thus, as long as the price of the brand-name drug
is higher than the price of generic drugs, these consumers only choose between di¤erent generic
alternatives.
We derive the equilibrium for di¤erent reimbursement schemes, i.e., coinsurance and reference
pricing, both exogenous (the reference price does not depend on current prices) and endogenous
(the reference price depends on current prices). We report three key ndings. First, for a given
number of rms, reference pricing leads to lower prices of both brand-name and generic drugs and
a higher brand-name market share than a reimbursement scheme based on coinsurance. Thus,
the brand-name producers responds aggressively to reference pricing and cut prices more than the
generic producers. The reason for the weaker price response from the generic producers is due to
two counteracting forces. For a given brand-name price, reference pricing shifts demand towards
generic drugs and thus provides an incentive for generic producers to increase prices. However,
the price reduction by the brand-name producer gives an incentive for generic producers to
also reduce prices, which is due to the fact that prices are strategic complements. Our result
shows that the second e¤ect dominates, but that in equilibrium the brand-name producer cuts
prices relatively more then the generic producers, and thus obtain a higher market share under
reference pricing, for a given number of rms.
Second, reference pricing reduces the number of generic drugs that enters the market com-
pared with coinsurance. This result holds for both endogenous and exogenous reference pricing.
The aggressive price setting by the brand-name producer under reference pricing implies lower
expected prots for the generic producers than under coinsurance. Thus, in the free entry
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equilibrium, the net e¤ects of reference pricing on prices and expenditures are in general am-
biguous. We illustrate with a numerical example that reference pricing can be counterproductive
in reducing prices and expenditures.
Third, allowing for price cap regulation, which is binding for the higher priced brand-name
drug, we show that the negative e¤ect of reference pricing on generic entry can be reversed. In-
deed, if the price cap is su¢ ciently strict, introducing reference pricing may actually increase the
number of generic drugs on the market. The reason is that binding price cap regulation reduces
the brand-name price di¤erence between reimbursement schemes with and without reference
pricing. Generic producers may therefore obtain higher market shares under reference pricing.
Thus, reference pricing is more likely to stimulate generic entry and facilitate cost savings when
prices are regulated than in the free pricing equilibrium.
Our paper contributes to the existing literature along several dimensions. First, our model
builds on the seminal work by Frank and Salkever (1992) who proposed a model with two
consumer segments a price insensitive and a price sensitive segment in order to explain the
generic competition paradox, i.e., brand-name producers respond to generic entry by increasing
their prices. Their model provides a very appealing explanation for the generic competition
paradox, namely market segmentation: the brand-name producer serves only the price insensitive
consumers, leaving the price sensitive consumers to the generic producers. To arrive at this
result, the model involved three key assumptions; (i) the demand from the price insensitive
consumers depends only on the price of the brand-name drug, (ii) the game is Stackelberg where
the brand-name producer commits to a price; (iii) generic producers compete in quantities á la
Cournot with a market-clearing price of generic drugs. Later studies by Kong and Seldon (2004)
and Regan (2008) generalise the model by Frank and Salkever (1992) by allowing demand from
price insensitive consumers to depend on both the brand-name and the generic drug prices, but
they maintain the other two assumptions.
The contribution of our paper is to build on the market segmentation model by Frank and
Salkever (1992), but propose a model that relax all the three above-mentioned assumptions.
More precisely, we allow for (i) the demand from brand biased (or price insensitive) consumers
to depend on prices of generic drugs; (ii) brand-name and generic producers to simultaneously
set prices; and (iii) generic producers to set prices rather than quantities. Thus, we avoid the
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criticism of Stackelberg games, where the rst-mover (brand-name producer) has an incentive
to re-optimise (its price) after entry (of generic producers). We also avoid the criticism of a
market-clearing price related to Cournot competition, which has limited empirical support in
the pharmaceutical market.
However, our study is not the rst to assume that generic producers set prices. There exists
several studies that allow for price competition between brand-name and generic producers.5
However, these studies assume only one generic producer in the market. Thus, the contribution
of our paper in regard to this literature is to allow for several generic producers. There is one
recent paper by Ghislandi (2011) that allows for more than one generic producer in the market.
By considering an innitely repeated two-stage game, where at stage 1 the rms set prices that
determine the reference price and at stage 2 the rms set prices taking the reference price as
given, he shows that an optimal reference pricing scheme should only depend on generic prices
in order to avoid collusion among generic producers. However, in Ghislandi (2011) there is
either perfect competition (á la Bertrand) or collusion among the generic producers, and he
is not concerned with the impact of reference pricing on generic entry. Thus, our paper di¤er
signicantly both in terms of research question and modeling framework.
Finally, our paper contributes to the empirical literature on the e¤ect of reference pricing
on generic competition. Several papers have analysed the impact of reference pricing and tend
to nd that it stimulates generic competition and leads to lower prices and expenditures.6 An
exception is Danzon and Chao (2000), who argue that reference pricing might be counterproduc-
tive in curbing pharmaceutical expenditures.7 Moreover, Ekelund (2001) analyse the Swedish
pharmaceutical market and nd (weak) evidence of a negative e¤ect of reference pricing on
generic entry, whereas Rudholm (2001) nd no e¤ect of reference pricing on generic entry in
Sweden. A study by Moreno-Torres et al. (2009) on the Spanish market nd that reference
pricing has a negative e¤ect on generic entry, whereas a recent study by Brekke et al. (2015)
on the Norwegian market nd that reference pricing has a positive e¤ect on generic entry. Our
paper suggests that the mixed empirical ndings can be explained by the presence and strictness
5See, for instance, Brekke et al. (2007, 2011) and Miraldo (2009).
6See, for instance, Aronsson et.al, (2001), Pavcnik (2002)Brekke et al. (2009, 2011) and Kaiser et al. (2014).
7Danzon and Ketcham (2004) provide empirical evidence that RP leads to a price convergence towards the
reference price, implying that brand-name drug prices drop whereas generics prices increase.
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of price cap regulation.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. In Section 2 we present our basic model.
In Section 3 we derive the equilibrium for a coinsurance (or xed percentage) reimbursement
scheme. In Section 4 we derive the equilibrium for (endogenous and exogenous) reference pricing,
and compare this with the equilibrium under coinsurance. In Section 5 we introduce price cap
regulation. Section 6 concludes the paper. The proofs of all Lemmas and Propositions are
relegated to the Appendix.
2 Model
Consider a pharmaceutical market with a brand-name drug that has lost patent protection and
faces competition from generic producers (indexed by i = 1; :::; n). Each generic producer can
enter the market by incurring a xed cost f . Suppose the market is represented by a Salop circle
with circumference 1 and a uniform distribution of consumers with total mass equal to 1, and
that the n generic producers that enter the market are symmetrically located on the circle.8
We assume that there are two di¤erent types of consumers in the market. At each point
on the circle, a share  of the consumers are brand biased, whereas the remaining share 1   
are brand neutral. Brand biased consumers have a preference for the brand-name drug and will
only buy a generic alternative if it is su¢ ciently much cheaper. We model this by assuming that
there are mismatch costs associated with buying a generic drug instead of the brand-name drug.
The utility of an arbitrary brand biased consumer located at x 2 [0; 1] on the circle is given by
ubb (x) =
8><>: v   cb if consuming the brand-name drugv   cig   t x  zig if consuming generic drug i ; (1)
with i = 1; :::; n. The parameter v denotes the gross utility (reservation price) of medical treat-
ment, cb and cig are the copayments of the brand-name drug and the generic drug i, respectively,
and t
x  zig is the mismatch (switching) cost of consuming a generic drug i located at zig. Thus,
in the segment of brand biased consumers, the degree of brand bias varies across consumers and
8This assumption is reasonable given that consumers are uniformly distributed and there is price competition
among rms (see Economides, 1989), and captures the fact that generic drugs can be perceived as horizontally
di¤erentiated by consumers (e.g., due to di¤erent product name, package, presentation form, etc.).
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is reected by the consumer locations on the circle.
The remaining consumers are assumed to be brand neutral and will always prefer a generic
drug if it is cheaper than the brand-name drug. Thus, as long as the price of the brand-name
drug is higher than the price of generic drugs, these consumers will only choose between di¤erent
generic alternatives, which we assume are considered imperfect substitutes in a strictly horizontal
sense. The utility of an arbitrary brand neutral consumer located at x who consumes generic
drug i, located at zig, is given by
ubn (x) = v   cig   t
x  zig : (2)
Notice that the parameter t has di¤erent interpretations for brand biased and brand neutral
consumers. For the former, it reects the degree of vertical di¤erentiation between brand-
name and generic drugs, whereas for the latter it reects the degree of horizontal di¤erentiation
between di¤erent generic drugs.9
Technically, the di¤erence between brand biased and brand neutral consumers lies in their
perceptions about the location of the brand-name drug. Whereas brand biased consumers per-
ceive the brand-name drug to be located at every single point on the circle, brand neutral
consumers perceive the brand-name drug to be co-located with the generic drugs (implying that
a brand neutral consumer would buy the brand-name drug only if the copayment is lower than
the copayment for this consumers most preferred generic drug).
Applying this model to price competition in o¤-patent drug markets, we will look for equilib-
ria where the market is fully covered (implying that total demand is perfectly price inelastic) and
where both the brand-name and the generic producers have positive sales. In such equilibria, a
fraction of the brand biased consumers will buy the brand-name drug (with the remaining ones
buying the most preferred generic drug) whereas all brand neutral consumers will buy generic
drugs. Notice that, in the brand biased demand segment, each generic producer competes di-
rectly with the brand-name producer and only indirectly with the other generic producers (i.e.,
a price change by generics producer i will trigger a price response by the brand-name producer,
9A common parameter t is chosen in order to save notation. Our main results hold qualitatively also in the case
where the degree of vertical and horizontal di¤erentiation are represented by parameters tb and tg, respectively,
and where tb 6= tg.
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which in turn triggers price responses by the remaining generics producers j 6= i). However, in
the brand neutral segment, there is direct competition between di¤erent generic producers.
In the brand neutral demand segment, demand allocations are determined by the locations
of the consumers who are indi¤erent between the neighbouring generic drugs i and i+1. These
consumers are located a distance (1=2n) +
  
ci+1g   cig

=2

from the location of generic drug i.
With the assumption of full market coverage, demand allocations in the brand biased segment
are determined by the location of the consumers who are indi¤erent between the brand-name
drug and their most preferred generic drug i. These consumer are located a distance
 
cb   cig

=t
from the location of the generic drug i.10 Taking into consideration that in each demand segment
there are two locations of indi¤erent consumers, one on each side of generic drug i, the total
demand for this drug is given by
Dig =
2
t
 
cb   cig

+ (1  )
 
1
n
+
ci+1g + c
i 1
g   2cig
2
!
: (3)
The demand for the brand-name drug is given by total demand minus the sum of demands for
generic products:
Db = 
 
1  2n
t
 
cb   1
n
nX
i=1
cig
!!
: (4)
Observe that positive demand for the generic rm i in the brand biased segment requires that
the copayment for the generic drug is strictly lower than the copayment of the brand-name
drug, otherwise all brand biased consumers prefer to buy the brand-name drug. However, the
di¤erence in copayments cannot be too large, i.e.,
 
cb   cig

< t=2n, otherwise no consumer is
willing to buy the brand-name drug. This condition will always be satised in the equilibria we
are considering.
All producers (including the brand-name producer) are assumed to have constant and iden-
tical marginal costs of production, which we set to zero without loss of generality. The prot
10Technically, for this to be the location of the indi¤erent brand biased consumers, we also need
 
cb   cig

=t to
be smaller than (1=2n) +
  
ci+1g   cig

=2

, ensuring that i is the most preferred generic drug of the indi¤erent
consumer. Since we focus on symmetric equilibria, where the most preferred generic drug is the closest one, this
condition trivially holds under the assumption of positive sales.
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functions of the brand-name producer and generic producer i are then given by
b = pbDb; (5)
ig = p
i
gD
i
g   f; (6)
where pb and pig are the prices of the brand-name drug and the generic drug i, respectively.
We consider a two-stage game, where at Stage 1 the patent protection of the brand-name
drug expires and n generic producers (simultaneously) decide whether to enter (symmetrically)
the market depending on the expected prots relative to the xed cost. At Stage 2 there is price
competition between all rms in the market. The outcome of this price competition depends
on the regulatory policies in place. We will consider, and compare, two di¤erent reimbursement
schemes: coinsurance and reference pricing.11
3 Coinsurance
Suppose that the copayment is a xed percentage of the price of the demanded product. If
we let  2 (0; 1) be the coinsurance rate, the copayments for the brand-name drug and the
generic drug i are cb = pb and cig = p
i
g, respectively. With this copayment rule, the prot
maximisation problems of the brand-name producer and the generic producer i, at the second
stage of the game, are given by, respectively,
max
pb
b = pb
 
1  2n
t
 
pb   1
n
nX
i=1
pig
!!
; (7)
max
pig
ig = p
i
g

2
t
 
pb   pig

+ (1  )

1
n
+

2t
 
pi+1g + p
i 1
g   2pig

. (8)
The rst-order conditions of the prot-maximisation problems dened above are given by
@b
@pb
= 
 
1  2n
t
 
2pb   1
n
nX
i=1
pig
!!
= 0; (9)
11Following the standard practice in the literature, we use the term coinsurance to designate a reimbursement
scheme based on xed percentage reimbursement.
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@ig
@pig
=
2
t
 
pb   2pig

+ (1  )

1
n
+

2t
 
pi+1g + p
i 1
g
  2
t
pig

= 0; i = 1; :::; n: (10)
Applying symmetry (pig = pg for all i = 1; :::; n), the candidate equilibrium prices are given by
pb (n) =
(3 + ) t
4n (1 + 2)
(11)
pg (n) =
(2  ) t
2n (1 + 2)
(12)
As expected, a higher number of generic rms will lead to lower prices of all drugs in the market.
The following Lemma denes the condition for the existence of this equilibrium:12
Lemma 1 Under coinsurance, the unique Nash equilibrium in the price game, for a given num-
ber of rms, is given by (11)-(12), if  > 0:84216.
Notice that equilibrium existence requires that the share of brand biased consumers is suf-
ciently large. Otherwise, there will be an incentive for the brand-name producer to deviate
unilaterally from its candidate equilibrium strategy by setting the price equal to (or slightly
below) the generics price and capture all demand from both segments.
Assuming that the condition stated in Lemma 1 is satised, the demand (and market share)
of the brand-name drug is given by
Db
 
pb (n) ; p

g (n)

=
 (3 + )
2 (1 + 2)
: (13)
A noteworthy feature of the equilibrium under coinsurance is that the brand-name market share
does not depend on the number of generic competitors. In this equilibrium, generic entry will
reduce brand-name and generic drug prices (and therefore copayments) proportionally, leaving
the brand-name market share unchanged.
The equilibrium prots of the two types of drug suppliers are given by
b
 
pb (n) ; p

g (n)

=
 (3 + )2 t
8n (1 + 2)2
; (14)
12All proofs are in Appendix.
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g
 
pb (n) ; p

g (n)

=
(1 + ) (2  )2 t
4n2 (1 + 2)2
  f: (15)
In a free-entry equilibrium (i.e., the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium of the full game), the
equilibrium number of generic producers, n, is the highest integer number that satises the
following weak inequality,
(1 + ) (2  )2 t
4 (n)2 (1 + 2)2
  f  0: (16)
4 Reference pricing
Suppose now that the reimbursement scheme is based on reference pricing. Let the reference
price set by the regulator, which denes the maximum reimbursement, be given by r. Assuming
that r lies somewhere between the prices of brand-name and generic drugs, which is the most
frequently observed case, this reimbursement scheme implies that the patient copayments for
the brand-name drug and for generic drug i, respectively, are given by
cb = r + pb   r (17)
and
cig = p
i
g: (18)
Applying the terminology of Brekke et al. (2011), we will distinguish between two di¤erent
cases: (i) exogenous reference pricing, where r does not depend on actual drug prices, and (ii)
endogenous reference pricing, where r is endogenously determined as a function of the prices
chosen by the drug suppliers. Although most countries that use reference pricing practice some
form of endogenous RP, the case of exogenous reference pricing is arguably the best approxi-
mation to reimbursement schemes where the reference price is not frequently updated or where
updates are not based on predened rules.
4.1 Exogenous reference pricing
Applying the copayment rules given by (17)-(18), the prot maximisation problems of the brand-
name producer and the generic producer i, at the second stage of the game, are given by,
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respectively,
max
pb
b = pb
 
1  2n
t
 
r + pb   r   
n
nX
i=1
pig
!!
; (19)
max
pig
ig = p
i
g
 
2
t
 
r + pb   r   pig

+ (1  )
 
1
n
+

 
pi+1g + p
i 1
g   2pig

2t
!!
: (20)
We will here look for a Nash equilibrium in the price game that implies an interior solution, with
pig < r < pb. Assuming an interior solution, the rst-order conditions of the prot-maximisation
problems dened above are given by
@b
@pb
= 
 
1  2n
t
 
2pb   (1  ) r   
n
nX
i=1
pig
!!
= 0; (21)
@ig
@pig
=
2
t
 
pb   (1  ) r   2pig

+ (1  )

1
n
+

2t
 
pi+1g + p
i 1
g
  2
t
pig

= 0; i = 1; :::; n:
(22)
Applying symmetry (pig = pg for all i = 1; :::; n) and simultaneously solving (21)-(22), the
equilibrium candidate prices are
pb (r; n) =
(3 + ) t+ 2 (1 + ) (1  )nr
4n (1 + 2)
; (23)
pg (r; n) =
(2  ) t  2 (1  )nr
2n (1 + 2)
: (24)
As for the case of drug reimbursement based on coinsurance, drug prices are monotonically
decreasing in the number of generic rms. It is worth noticing, though, that changes in the
reference price, r, have opposite e¤ects on brand-name and generic drug prices. As long as the
reference price lies between generic and brand-name prices, a reduction in the reference price
makes the brand-name drug relatively more expensive for consumers, which, all else equal, shifts
demand from brand-name to generic drugs. The optimal response from a generic (brand-name)
producer is therefore to increase (reduce) its price. The exact conditions for these prices to
constitute a Nash equilibrium in the price game are given by the following Lemma:
Lemma 2 Under exogenous reference pricing, the unique Nash equilibrium in the price game,
for a given number of rms, is an interior solution given by (23)-(24), if the following conditions
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are satised: (i) r < r < r, where r := (2 )t2((1+)+)n and r :=
(3+)t
2((1+)+1+3)n ; (ii)  >
max

2 
2+ ;
e, where e is strictly less than one.
Assuming that these conditions are satised, the brand-name market share and the prots
of both types of drug producers are, in equilibrium, given by
Db
 
pb (r; n) ; p

g (r; n)

=
 ((3 + ) t+ 2 (1 + ) (1  )nr)
2 (1 + 2) t
(25)
and
b
 
pb (r; n) ; p

g (r; n)

=
 ((3 + ) t+ 2 (1 + ) (1  )nr)2
8t (1 + 2)2 n
; (26)
g
 
pb (r; n) ; p

g (r; n)

=
(1 + ) ((2  ) t  2 (1  )nr)2
4 (1 + 2)2 tn2
  f: (27)
Notice that changes in the reference price a¤ect equilibrium prots in a way that corresponds
to the equilibrium price responses. For a given number of rms, a lower reference price benets
generic producers at the expense of the brand-name producer. Since g
 
pb (r; n) ; p

g (r; n)

is
monotonically decreasing in n, the number of generic producers in a free-entry equilibrium, n,
is given by the highest integer number that satises the following weak inequality,
(1 + ) ((2  ) t  2 (1  )nr)2
4 (1 + 2)2 t (n)2
  f  0; (28)
and that simultaneously satises the conditions in Lemma 2.
4.2 Endogenous reference pricing
Under endogenous reference pricing systems, the reference price is calculated as a function of
one or more drug prices in the market. A formulation that is su¢ ciently general to capture
several realistic possibilities is
r = (1  ) pb + 
n
nX
i=1
pig; (29)
where the reference price is a linear combination of the brand-name drug price and the average
price of all generic drugs. A higher value of  2 (0; 1) implies that cheaper drugs are given larger
weights when calculating the reference price. In a symmetric equilibrium,  = 1 implies that
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the reference price is equal to the lowest price in the market.
Applying the copayment rules given by (17)-(18), and where r is given by (29), the prot
maximisation problems of the brand-name producer and the generic producer i, at the second
stage of the game, are given by, respectively,
max
pb
b = pb
 
1  2n
t
 
pb   1
n
nX
i=1
pig
!!
; (30)
max
pig
ig = p
i
g
 

 
2
t
 
pb   (1  )
n
nX
i=1
pig   pig
!!
+ (1  )
 
1
n
+

 
pi+1g + p
i 1
g   2pig

2t
!!
;
(31)
where  :=  + (1  ) 2 (0; 1). The rst-order conditions of these prot maximisation
problems are
@b
@pb
= 
 
1  2n
t
 
2pb   1
n
nX
i=1
pig
!!
= 0 (32)
@ig
@pig
=
2
t
0@pb   (1  )
n
0@2pig +X
j 6=i
pjg
1A  2pig
1A+(1  ) 1
n
+

 
pi+1g + p
i 1
g   4pig

2t
!
= 0
(33)
Notice here how the endogeneity of the reference price gives the suppliers of generic drugs
incentives to price strategically in order to inuence the reference price. By reducing its price,
a generics producer will enforce a reduction in the reference price, which makes the brand-name
drug more expensive and therefore shifts demand towards generic drugs. This e¤ect, which is
captured by the second term in the rst parenthesis in (33), is stronger when  is higher or
when n is lower (which implies a larger weight on each single generic drug price in the reference
price formula). Reference pricing also gives the brand-name producer incentives to reduce its
price (second term in (32)), because demand becomes more elastic for prices above r.
Applying symmetry (pig = pg for all i = 1; :::; n) and simultaneously solving (33)-(32), the
equilibrium candidate prices are
pb (; n) =
(n (3 + ) + 2 (1  ) (n+ )) t
4n (n (1 + 2) +  (1  ) (n+ 2)) ; (34)
pg (; n) =
(2  ) t
2 (n (1 + 2) +  (1  ) (n+ 2)) : (35)
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As for the case of coinsurance or exogenous RP, it is straightforward to conrm that all drug
prices are decreasing in n. They are also monotonically decreasing in . The more weight the
prices of generic drugs carry in the reference price formula, the lower are the prices set by all
drug suppliers in the market. The condition for these prices to constitute a Nash equilibrium in
the price game is given by the following Lemma:
Lemma 3 Under endogenous reference pricing, the unique Nash equilibrium in the price game,
for a given number of rms, is given by (34)-(35), if  > , where  is strictly less than one.
Given that this condition is satised, the equilibrium brand-name market share is given by
Db
 
pb (; n) ; p

g (; n)

=

2
n (3 + ) + 2 (1  ) (n+ )
n (1 + 2) +  (1  ) (n+ 2) : (36)
It is easily conrmed that the brand-name market share is increasing in n. The reason for
this perhaps surprising result is related to the fact that changes in n have partly counteracting
e¤ects on the pricing incentives of brand-name and generic producers. An increase in n makes
the demand for all drug types more elastic, which all else equal leads to lower prices. This is
the dominant e¤ect for both brand-name and generic drugs. However, an increase in n also has a
counteracting e¤ect on the pricing incentives of generics producers. A higher number of generic
drugs implies that the price of each of these drugs has a smaller weight in the reference price
formula, which reduces the incentive for each generic producer to strategically reduce its price
in order to induce a lower reference price. Thus, increased generic competition leads to a larger
price reduction for brand-name than for generic producers, to the extent that the equilibrium
brand-name market share increases.
The equilibrium prots of both type of drug suppliers are given by
b
 
pb (; n) ; p

g (; n)

=
t (n (3 + ) + 2 (1  ) (n+ ))2
8n (n (1 + 2) +  (1  ) (n+ 2))2 ; (37)
g
 
pb (; n) ; p

g (; n)

= :
t (n (1 + ) + 2 (1  )) (2  )2
4n (n (1 + 2) +  (1  ) (n+ 2))2   f: (38)
Since g
 
pb (; n) ; p

g (; n)

is monotonically decreasing in n, the number of generic pro-
ducers in a free-entry equilibrium, n, is given by the highest integer number that satises the
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following weak inequality,
t (n (1 + ) + 2 (1  )) (2  )2
4n (n (1 + 2) +  (1  ) (n + 2))2   f  0; (39)
and that simultaneously satises the condition in Lemma 3.
4.3 Coinsurance versus reference pricing
Let us now compare the two reimbursement systems considered coinsurance and (exogenous
or endogenous) reference pricing  and see how the choice of reimbursement scheme a¤ects
equilibrium drug prices and prots for a given number of rms, and how it consequently a¤ects
generic entry.
Proposition 1 Suppose that the conditions given by Lemmas 1-3 are all satised. Then, for
a given number of rms, the price equilibrium under reference pricing is characterised by lower
prices for all drugs and a higher brand-name market share, compared with the price equilibrium
under coinsurance. These results hold regardless of whether the reference price is exogenous or
endogenous.
The intuition for the price reducing e¤ect of reference pricing is fairly straightforward. Since
reference pricing makes demand for the brand-name drug more price elastic (for prices above
the reference price), the brand-name producer will respond by lowering its price. Although
reference pricing makes generic drugs relatively cheaper (all else equal), and therefore gives the
generic producers an isolated incentive to raise prices, the strategic complementarity of price
setting ensures that generic prices also drop.13 If the reference price is endogenous, the generic
producers also have an extra incentive to reduce prices, since such price reductions will reduce
the reference price and therefore make the brand-name drug more expensive for consumers.14
In many ways, though, the key result in Proposition 1 is not that reference pricing leads to
lower prices, which is intuitive and expected, but that the reduction in brand-name prices is
13For the case of exogenous reference pricing, notice the di¤erence between switching from coinsurance to
reference pricing and changing the reference price within the latter system. Whereas generic prices are lower
under reference pricing than under coinsurance for any r 2 (r; r), a reduction in r under an exogenous reference
pricing system leads to an increase in generic drug prices, as discussed in Section 4.1.
14Notice that the results in Proposition 1 hold for all values of  that ensure equilibrium existence. Thus, our
results do not depend crucially on the presence of a brand neutral consumer segment.
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proportionally larger than the reduction in generic prices, implying that the market share of the
brand-name drug increases. When reference pricing (whether endogenous or exogenous) leads to
a reduction in both price and demand for generic producers, the implications for generic entry
follow directly:
Corollary 1 Suppose that the conditions given by Lemmas 1-3 are all satised. Then, in a free
entry equilibrium, the number of generic drugs is (weakly) higher under coinsurance than under
(exogenous or endogenous) reference pricing.
In some sense, this result might be seen as counterintuitive, since reference pricing is a
reimbursement scheme designed to give generic producers a competitive advantage vis-à-vis
brand-name producers. Indeed, for given drug prices, a switch from coinsurance to reference
pricing will shift demand towards generic drugs and therefore benet generic producers. How-
ever, as Proposition 1 shows, such a switch will also trigger price responses such that the generic
producers end up with lower prots. Thus, a switch from coinsurance to reference pricing will
lead to fewer generic drugs in a free entry equilibrium.
4.4 Can reference pricing be counterproductive?
When taking into account the e¤ect on generic entry, the intended cost-containing e¤ect of
reference pricing is no longer obvious. One the one hand, reference pricing leads to lower prices
for all existing drugs in the market. On the other hand, the above analysis also shows that
reference pricing can drive out generic competition (measured by the number of generic drugs),
which all else equal leads to higher prices. If the latter e¤ect dominates the former, reference
pricing will actually be counterproductive, in the sense that reference pricing will increase total
drug expenditures.
In our model it is not analytically feasible to give a precise characterisation of the required
conditions for reference pricing to be counterproductive or not. However, we have constructed a
numerical example (in Table 1) in order to show that a cost increasing e¤ect of reference pricing
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is at least a theoretical possibility.
Table 1: Endogenous reference pricing and generic entry
Coinsurance Endogenous reference pricing
 = 0:4  = 0:4;  = 0:5
n 5 3
pb 0:348 0:355
pg 0:196 0:234
Db 0:627 0:671
pav 0:292 0:315
Parameter values:  = 0:9; t = 2; f = 0:0146
In this example, endogenous reference pricing leads to higher prices for all drugs (compared to
coinsurance) in the free entry equilibrium. Moreover, under reference pricing a larger share of
consumers choose the most expensive drug. Consequently, the equilibrium under reference pric-
ing is characterised by a higher average drug price and therefore higher total drug expenditures.
The reason is that only three generic rms nd it protable to enter the market under reference
pricing, whereas ve generic rms can protably survive under coinsurance.
5 Price cap regulation
In the above analysis we have assumed that only the reimbursement scheme is subject to regula-
tion (coinsurance versus endogenous or exogenous reference pricing), whereas the drug producers
can freely set prices. However, in many countries drug pricing is subject to price cap regulation,
which is also often combined with reference pricing. The presence of price cap regulation can
potentially change the e¤ect of reference pricing on generic entry, as we will explore in this
section where we assume that the drug producers are not allowed to set prices in excess of p.
We also assume that this price cap binds for the brand-name producer in the Nash equilibrium
under coinsurance.15
15 If the price cap does not bind under coinsurance, it will not bind under reference pricing either, which
implies that price cap regulation is irrelevant for any decisions taken by the rms, including the decision of
generic producers to enter or exit the market.
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With a binding price cap, the Nash equilibrium in the price game (under coinsurance) is
then a corner solution with the following prices:
pb = p; (40)
pg (p; n) =
(1  ) t+ 2np
n (1 + 3)
; (41)
where the candidate equilibrium price pg is found by inserting pb = p into (10), applying sym-
metry, and solving for pg. The following Lemma states the condition for equilibrium existence:
Lemma 4 Under coinsurance, the unique Nash equilibrium in the price game for a given number
of rms is a corner solution, given by (40)-(41), if the following conditions are satised: (i)
(1 )t
n(1+) < p <
(3+)t
4n(1+2) ; (ii)  > max

1
3 ;
b, where b is strictly less than one.
Notice that the lower bound on p is necessary to ensure that all rms are active in equilibrium
(which requires that the the generic producers price their drugs below the regulated price cap).
Assuming that the conditions in Lemma 4 are satised, the brand-name market share and
the prots of both types of drug producers are, in equilibrium, given by
Db
 
p; pg (p; n)

=
 ((3 + ) t  2 (1 + )np)
(1 + 3) t
(42)
and
b
 
p; pg (p; n)

=
 ((3 + ) t  2 (1 + )np) p
(1 + 3) t
; (43)
g
 
p; pg (p; n)

=
(1 + ) (t (1  ) + 2np)2
(1 + 3)2 n2t
  f: (44)
In contrast to the case of an interior solution, as long as the price cap is binding for the brand-
name producer, generic entry will reduce generic drug prices without a¤ecting the brand-name
drug price, thus reducing the market share of the brand-name producer. Nevertheless, it is
straightforward to verify that g
 
p; pg (p; n)

is monotonically decreasing in n. Thus, in a free-
entry equilibrium, the equilibrium number of generic producers, n, is given by the highest
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integer number satisfying the weak inequality
(1 + ) (t (1  ) + 2np)2
(1 + 3)2 (n)2 t
  f  0; (45)
while simultaneously satisfying the conditions given in Lemma 4.
Let us now compare this equilibrium with the equilibrium under exogenous reference pric-
ing.16 If the price cap binds also in the reference pricing equilibrium (i.e., the equilibrium is
characterised by pg < r < pb = p), then reference pricing has no e¤ect on the brand-name price
and therefore does not stimulate price competition between brand-name and generic drugs. In
this case the only e¤ect of reference pricing is the positive demand e¤ect for generics, since
reference pricing makes the brand-name drug more expensive. Consequently, reference pricing
will unambiguously stimulate generic entry.
On the other hand, if the price cap does not bind in the reference pricing equilibrium (i.e.,
the equilibrium is characterised by pg < r < pb < p), the conditions for such an equilibrium to
exist are given by Lemma 2. A comparison between coinsurance and exogenous reference pricing
under price cap regulation yields the following results:
Proposition 2 Suppose that the conditions given by Lemma 2 and Lemma 4 are all satised.
Then, for a given number of rms, brand-name drug prices are always lower under exogenous
reference pricing than under coinsurance, whereas generic drug prices are lower (higher) and
brand-name market shares are higher (lower) under exogenous reference pricing if p > (<) bp,
where bp := (3+)t 2(1 )(1+3)nr4(1+2)n .
We see that the previous results (given by Proposition 1) holds only if the price cap is
su¢ ciently large (p > bp). If the price cap binds to a su¢ ciently strong degree (p < bp), the
price di¤erence between brand-name and generic drugs is relatively small under coinsurance,
and the brand-name market share is larger than it would have been with a less binding price
cap. In this case, the brand-name price reduction in response to a switch from coinsurance
to reference pricing is relatively small (zero if the price cap binds in both equilibria) and the
generic producers incentive to increase prices under reference pricing dominates the strategic
16Similar results would obtain if we instead consider endogenous reference pricing.
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complementarity e¤ect, leading to both higher prices and higher market shares for the generic
producers. The implications for generic entry follow immediately:
Corollary 2 Suppose that the conditions given by Lemma 2 and Lemma 4 are all satised.
Then, in a free entry equilibrium, the number of generic drugs is (weakly) higher under exogenous
reference pricing than under coinsurance if p < bp.
As previously stated, there are two counteracting e¤ects of reference pricing on the prots of
generic sales, and therefore on the incentives for generic entry. For given prices, reference pricing
makes the brand-name drug more expensive for consumers, which shifts demand towards generic
drugs. However, this e¤ect is counteracted by the negative price response of the brand-name
producer. For reference pricing to stimulate generic entry, the second (price) e¤ect therefore
needs to be su¢ ciently small relative to the rst (demand) e¤ect. In our model this happens if
price cap regulation is su¢ ciently strict.
Even in the more general case where reference pricing has both a demand e¤ect and a price
competition e¤ect, Proposition 2 suggests that the potential for reference pricing to stimulate
generic entry relies crucially on how the introduction of reference pricing a¤ects market shares
for the existing drugs in the market:
Corollary 3 Suppose that the conditions given by Lemma 2 and Lemma 4 are all satised.
Switching from coinsurance to reference pricing can then lead to generic entry if and only if it
increases the market share of the existing generic producers in the market.
Since, in equilibrium, all drug prices are monotonically decreasing in the number of generic
producers, initial price reductions caused by the introduction of reference pricing might be
counteracted (reinforced) by exit (entry) of generics producers. It is perhaps instructive to
consider a numerical example in order to see the mechanisms at play.
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Table 2: RP and generic entry under price cap regulation
Coinsurance Reference pricing
(1) p = 0:3 (2) p = 0:35 r = 0:25
n 2 4 3
pb 0:3 0:35 0:283
pg 0:214 0:204 0:207
Db 0:838 0:690 0:764
pav 0:286 0:305 0:265
Parameter values:  = 0:4;  = 0:9; t = 2; f = 0:015
In Table 2 we consider two di¤erent scenarios under coinsurance. In both scenarios the free-
entry equilibrium is a corner solution, but in Scenario 2 (p > bp) the price cap is less binding than
in Scenario 1 (p < bp). Notice rst that, under coinsurance, stricter price cap regulation drives
out generic competition (the equilibrium number of generic rms is two in Scenario 1 and four
in Scenario 2). The brand-name market share is consequently much higher in the scenario with
the lower price cap, for two di¤erent reasons: there is less competition from generic rms and
the branded-generic price di¤erence is lower. Thus, in Scenario 1 the introduction of reference
pricing leads to only a small drop in the brand-name price. This makes generic entry protable
and the equilibrium number of generic rms increases from two to three. From Proposition 2
and Corollary 2 we know that if reference pricing increases incentives for generic entry, it leads
to higher generic drug prices in the absence of new entrants. In the numerical example in Table
2 we see that this e¤ect is more than outweighed by increased competition from the new entrant,
implying that reference pricing leads to lower generic prices in the free-entry equilibrium. As
expected, the brand-name market share also goes down.
On the other hand, in Scenario 2, where the price cap is less binding in equilibrium under
coinsurance, and where there is consequently room for four generic drugs, the introduction of
reference pricing leads to a much larger drop in the brand-name drug price, with a corresponding
reduction in generic drug prices. This makes the existing market structure unsustainable and
the number of generics producers is reduced from four to three in the free-entry equilibrium.
Exit of one generic drug reduces the degree of competition in the market and partly counteracts
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the initial reduction in prices. However, despite an increase in generic prices, and despite the
fact that a larger fraction of consumers buy the more expensive (brand-name) drug after the
introduction of reference pricing, the average price in the market (pav) nevertheless drops, mainly
because of the relatively large drop in the brand-name price.
6 Conclusion
Since reference pricing is a widespread regulatory mechanism in pharmaceutical markets, de-
termining its e¤ect on prices is crucial. Many studies have addressed this issue theoretically
and empirically. However, to the best of our knowledge, these studies, by taking the number
of generics as given, ignore the e¤ect of reference pricing on generic entry. This is a serious
limitation of the existing literature, since any e¤ect on entry would reect indirectly on prices
and pharmaceutical expenditures.
This paper is an attempt to provide a theoretical framework to study the impact of reference
pricing on entry and, ultimately, its overall e¤ect on drug prices. We develop a Salop-type
model that allows us to study generic entry. In a nutshell, we show that reference pricing
always discourages entry, and can thus drive up equilibrium drug prices. Such a result is very
robust to alternative specications of the demand function, and to alternative formulas dening
the reference price. The main intuition for this result is that brand-name rms respond very
aggressively to the introduction of reference pricing, and they always increase their market shares
through price reductions.
This general result is mitigated if other forms of regulation are present on the market. If prices
are also subject to caps, then the e¤ect of reference pricing on generic entry may be positive.
Intuitively, if the price of the brand-name rm is constrained by the cap, the introduction of
reference pricing leads to a relatively small price response. Thus, whereas either price cap
regulation or reference pricing in isolation discourages generic entry, one of these regulatory
schemes (reference pricing) can perhaps paradoxically serve to counteract the negative e¤ect
of the other (price cap regulation) on generic entry.
Our model provides a framework to evaluate the impact of reference pricing in di¤erent
markets. The overall e¤ect on prices is ambiguous and is ultimately an empirical question. The
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main empirical predictions of the model are that, (i) without price caps, generic entry should
be discouraged by the introduction of reference pricing and (ii) if price caps are present, the
introduction or reference pricing may encourage entry if price caps are su¢ ciently binding.
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Appendix: Proofs
Proof of Lemma 1 Equilibrium existence requires that the brand-name rm has no incentive
to deviate by setting pb = pg (n) and capture the whole market. Since total demand is
equal to one, this would give a prot of b = pg (n). Such a deviation is not protable if
b
 
pb (n) ; p

g (n)
  pg (n) =    14+ 2   3  8 t
8n (1 + 2)2
> 0;
which holds for  > 0:84216. Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 2 Condition (i): The upper and lower bounds on r are determined by
straightforward comparisons of r with pb (r; n) and p

g (r; n), applying the equilibrium con-
dition pg (r; n) < r < pb (r; n). Condition (ii): Two lower bounds on  are needed. The rst
one ensures that the interval of r established in the rst part of the Lemma is non-empty:
r   r = (1 + 2) ((1 + )  2 (1  )) t
2n ((1 + )+ ) (1 + 3+  (1 + ))
> 0 if  >
2  
2 + 
:
The other lower bound on  is necessary to rule out the possibility of protable deviations
by the brand-name rm. This rm can capture the entire market and obtain a prot
pg (r; n) by setting the price pb = pg (r; n). Such a deviation is not protable if:
b
 
pb (r; n) ; p

g (r; n)
  pg (r; n)
=
2666666664
4nr (1  )
0B@ t  2 + 4 (1 + ) +   3 + 2
+nr (1 + )2 (1  )
1CA
+t2
0B@ 

(3 + )2   12

 8 (1  ) (1 + )
1CA
3777777775
8nt (1 + 2)2
> 0:
The numerator is monotonically increasing in r. By setting r at the lower bound, r = r,
the condition reduces to
2 (1 + )2   (1  ) (8 (1 + ) + 4) > 0:
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It is straightforward to verify that the expression on the left-hand side of this inequality is
monotonically increasing in  for  > 2 2+ . Thus, since the expression is strictly positive
for ! 1, the condition must hold for any  > e, where e is strictly less than 1. Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 3 Equilibrium existence requires that it is not protable for the brand-name
producer to deviate by setting pb = pg (; n), get all demand (which is equal to one) and
earn a prot of pg (; n). Such a deviation is not protable if
b
 
pb (; n) ; p

g (; n)
  pg (; n) = tn22  142 + 3   3  8+ 4 (1  ) 
8n (n (1 + 2) +  (1  ) (n+ 2))2 > 0;
(A1)
where
 : = 3   2n2  3 + 4n22 + n22   4n  4n+ 5n2
 2n2+ n3 + 4n2   n2  4n2 + n2  n22 + 4n:
The sign of (A1) is determined by the sign of the numerator, which we will denote by 
.
First,
@2

@2
= 2
0B@ n22 (14 + 3) + 4n22 (1  )2 + 20n (1  )
+4 (1  ) (4n+ 3) ( + n  )
1CA > 0;
which conrms that 
 is convex in . Furthermore,
lim
!1
@

@
= 4
0B@ 7n22 + n2 (1  )2 (n+ 4)
+9n (1  ) + 3 (1  )      + 2n2
1CA > 0;
lim
!1

 = 4 ( + n  )2 > 0;
and
lim
!0

 =  8n2 < 0;
which conrms the existence of a threshold value , which is strictly below one, such that

, and therefore b
 
pb (; n) ; p

g (; n)
   pg (; n), is positive (negative) if  > (<).
Q.E.D.
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Proof of Proposition 1 (i) Exogenous reference pricing versus coinsurance: Comparing (23)
and (11), the change in the equilibrium brand-name price is
pb (r; n)  pb (n) =  
(1  ) ((3 + ) t  2 (1 + )nr)
4n (2+ 1)
< 0 for r < r:
Comparing (24) and (12), the change in the equilibrium generic price is
pg (r; n)  pg (n) =  
 (1  ) r
 (2+ 1)
< 0:
Comparing (25) and (13), the change in the equilibrium brand-name market share is
Db
 
pb (r; n) ; p

g (r; n)
 Db  pb (n) ; pg (n) =  (1 + ) (1  )nrt (1 + 2) > 0:
(ii) Endogenous reference pricing versus coinsurance: Since all equilibrium variables under
endogenous RP are monotonic in , and since the equilibria under endogenous reference
pricing and coinsurance coincide for  = 0, we can compare the equilibrium outcomes by
doing comparative statics on  in the reference pricing equilibrium. From (34), (35) and
(36), we have
@pb (; n)
@
=  t (1  )
264 n2  n+ 4+ 6n  22 + 3n2
+2 (1  ) (n+ 2) ( (1  ) (n+ ) + n (3 + ))
375
4n2 (n (1 + 2) +  (1  ) (n+ 2))2 < 0;
@pg (; n)
@
=   t (1  ) (2  ) (2 + n)
2 (n (1 + 2) +  (1  ) (n+ 2))2 < 0;
@Db
 
pb (; n) ; p

g (; n)

@
=
n (1  ) (2  ) (n (1 + )  2)
2 (n (1 + 2) +  (1  ) (n+ 2))2 > 0:
Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 4 Part (i): Given the equilibrium prices in the absence of price regulation,
(11)-(12), the upper bound on p is trivial. The lower bound on p is determined by the
condition that the price cap does not bind for the generics producers in equilibrium:
p > pg (p; n) if p >
(1 )t
n(1+) . Part (ii): Two lower bounds on  are needed for equilibrium
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existence. The rst is needed to ensure that the interval of p dened in the rst part of
the Lemma is non-empty:
(3 + ) t
4n (1 + 2)
  (1  ) t
n (1 + )
=
(3  1) (1 + 3) t
4 (1 + ) (1 + 2)n
> 0 if  >
1
3
:
In addition, equilibrium existence requires that it is not protable for the brand-name
producer to deviate by setting pb = pg (p; n), capturing the whole market, and obtaining
a prot pg (p; n). Such a deviation is not protable if
b
 
p; pg (p; n)
  pg (p; n) =  (1 + )np (t  2np)  (1  ) t2nt (1 + 3) > 0:
This condition holds if the numerator is positive. Using the conditions p < (3+)t4n(1+2) and
 > 13 , it is straightforward to verify that t  2np > 0, which implies that the numerator
is monotonically increasing in . Since the numerator is strictly positive for  ! 1, it
follows that the condition holds if  > b, where b is strictly less than 1. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 2 The e¤ects of reference pricing on prices and market shares when the
price cap binds in both equilibria are trivial. For the case of an interior solution in the
reference pricing equilibrium, the change in the equilibrium brand-name price is negative
by construction of the equilibrium (pb (r; n) < p). Comparing (24) and (41), the change
in the equilibrium generic price is
pg (r; n)  pg (p; n)
= 
(3 + ) t  (2 (1 + 3) (1  )nr + 4 (1 + 2)np)
2 (1 + 2) (1 + 3)n
< (>) 0 if p > (<) bp;
where
bp := (3 + ) t  2 (1  ) (1 + 3)nr
4 (1 + 2)n
:
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Comparing (25) and (42), the change in the equilibrium brand-name market share is
Db
 
pb (r; n) ; p

g (r; n)
 Db  p; pg (p; n)
=   (1 + ) (t (3 + )  2 (1 + 3) (1  )nr   4 (1 + 2)np)
2t (1 + 2) (1 + 3)
< (>) 0 if p < (>) bp:
In order to make the comparison between the two equilibria meaningful, we also need
to ensure that the intersection of the parameter sets that dene equilibrium existence is
non-empty. Since a non-binding price cap in the reference pricing equilibrium requires
p >
(3 + ) t+ 2 (1 + ) (1  )nr
4n (1 + 2)
;
we need to ensure that the parameter set dened by
max

(1  ) t
n (1 + )
;
(3 + ) t+ 2 (1 + ) (1  )nr
4n (1 + 2)

< p <
(3 + ) t
4n (1 + 2)
(A2)
is non-empty. From Lemma 2 we know that (3+)t4n(1+2) >
(1 )t
n(1+) if  >
1
3 . It remains to
show that
(3 + ) t
4n (1 + 2)
  (3 + ) t+ 2 (1 + ) (1  )nr
4n (1 + 2)
=
(1  ) (t (3 + )  2 (1 + )nr)
4 (1 + 2)n
> 0:
Since t (3 + )   2 (1 + )nr = (3+)(1+3)t1+3+(1+) > 0 for r = r, this condition holds for all
r 2 (r; r). Finally, we need to ensure that the threshold value bp dened by the Proposition
belongs to the set dened by (A2). This is easily conrmed, since
(3 + ) t
4n (1 + 2)
  bp = (1  ) (1 + 3) r
2 (1 + 2)
> 0;
bp  (1  ) t
n (1 + )
=
(1 + 3) (t (3  1)  2nr (1 + ) (1  ))
4n (1 + ) (1 + 2)
> 0
for  >
2  
2 + 
and r 2 (r; r) ;
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bp  (3 + ) t+ 2 (1 + ) (1  )nr
4n (1 + 2)
=
(1  ) ((3 + ) t  2nr ( (1 + ) + 1 + 3))
4n (2+ 1)
> 0
for r 2 (r; r) :
Q.E.D.
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